原文: Gipper B, Hail L, Leuz C. On the Economics of Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation and Tenure: Evidence from PCAOB Data[J]. The Accounting Review, 2021, 96 (2): 303–331.

On the Economics of Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation and Tenure: Evidence from PCAOB Data

ABSTRACT: We analyze the effects of partner tenure and mandatory rotation on audit quality, pricing, and production for a large cross-section of U.S. public firms during 2008–2014. On average, we find no evidence that audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for “fresh-look” benefits provided by the new audit partner. Audit fees decline and audit hours increase after mandatory rotation, but then reverse over the tenure cycle. We also find evidence that audit firms use “shadowing” in preparation for a lead partner turnover. These effects differ by competitiveness of the local audit market, client size, and partner experience. When multiple members of the audit team commence work at a new client, the transition appears to be more disruptive and more likely to exhibit audit quality effects. Our findings point to costly efforts by the audit firms to minimize disruptions and audit failures around mandatory rotations.

强制审计合伙人轮换和任期的经济性：来自PCAOB数据的证据

摘要：文章研究了2008-2014年期间，合伙人任期和强制轮换对美国上市公司审计质量、定价和产量的影响。平均而言，文章未发现任何证据表明审计质量会在任期周期内下降，也没有证据表明新的审计合作伙伴提供了“新面貌”的好处。强制轮换后，审计费用下降，审计时间增加，但在任期周期内会发生逆转。文章还发现，审计事务所采用提前“跟踪”来为主要合伙人的变更做准备。这些影响因当地审计市场的竞争力、客户规模和合作伙伴经验而不同。当审计团队的多个成员开始为一个新客户工作时，这种转变似乎更具破坏性，更可能表现出对审计质量的影响。我们的研究结果表明，审计公司为尽量减少强制性轮换带来的干扰和审计失败，付出了代价高昂的努力。

亮点：（1）已有的与审计轮换和任期相关的研究大多关注审计任期和审计轮换对审计报告和审计质量的影响，而文章从成本和收益的权衡的角度对审计轮换和任期进行研究，有利于我们更全面地认识强制性审计轮换制度；（2）之前的研究主要基于个别事务所特定的样本或从美国境外披露相关信息中获得的小样本，而文章分析了大量美国上市公司的审计任期和强制性审计轮换数据，研究结论更具有说服力。

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原文：Pittman J, Wang L, Wu DH. Network Analysis of Audit Partner Rotation [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2022

Network Analysis of Audit Partner Rotation

ABSTRACT:Focusing on mandatory partner rotations, we examine the importance of within-firm network connections to the selection of successor partners and the impact of those connections on post-rotation audit performance. Using data from China, we track partners' history and identify incumbent-successor connections stemming from jointly conducted prior engagements. Although these connections can enhance incumbent-successor information transfers and thus post-rotation audit performance, they may also pose a threat to quality by compromising the successor's independence. Among the pool of replacement candidates, we find that individuals with stronger connections with the incumbent are more likely to be appointed as successors. This finding is more pronounced when the audit engagement is more complex, client-specific knowledge is not readily available to the succeeding partner, and the engagement is more valuable to the audit firm. We also document that successor-incumbent connections are associated with equal or better post-rotation audit quality and fewer client defections. These results suggest that the benefits of network-based successor selection may outweigh its costs. By enriching our understanding of the partner transition process, this study contributes to the public policy discourse on partner rotation.

审计合伙人的网络分析

摘要：以强制性合伙人轮换为重点，我们研究了公司内部网络联系对继任合伙人选择的重要性，以及这些联系对轮换后审计绩效的影响。利用来自中国的数据，文章追踪合作伙伴的历史，并识别由之前的合作产生的现任与继任者之间的关系。尽管这些联系可以加强现任与继任者之间的信息传输，从而提高轮换后的审计绩效，但它们也可能会损害继任者的独立性而对质量构成威胁。在候补候选人中，我们发现与现任者关系更密切的个人更有可能被任命为继任者。当审计业务更加复杂、继任合伙人无法获得特定的客户知识、并且审计业务对事务所更有价值时，这一发现更加显著。文章还发现了继任者与现任者之间的联系与同等或更好的轮换后审计质量以及更少的客户流失有关。这些结果表明，基于网络的继任者选择的好处可能超过其成本。本研究丰富了对合伙人轮换过程的理解，对审计合伙人轮换政策有一定的实践意义。

亮点：（1）尽管已经有很多文献研究强制轮换合伙人，但几乎没有任何证据表明继任者是如何进行选择的，以及不同轮换策略的经济后果。文章角度新颖，探究现任合伙人与继任合伙人之间的关系及其对审计绩效的影响，有助于我们对继任合伙人有进一步的了解；（2）文章创新了衡量合伙人之间熟悉度的方式，即过去五年中现任合伙人和继任合伙人共同签署审计报告的频率来衡量合伙人之间的熟悉程度，该衡量方式巧妙得当。

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原文：Dordzhieva, A. Disciplining Role of Auditor Tenure and Mandatory Auditor Rotation [J]. The Accounting Review, 2022, 97 (2): 161–182.

Disciplining Role of Auditor Tenure and Mandatory Auditor Rotation

ABSTRACT: This study addresses the international debate over whether the rotation of audit firms should be mandatory. Mandatory rotation rules have been adopted by the European Union, but these rules have not been established in the United States. Proponents of the policy believe that a long-tenure auditor-client relationship leads to the auditor building an excessive economic bond with the client, which may then erode auditor independence. Motivated by this claim, I build a theoretical model that compares auditor incentives to issue independent reports under regimes with and without mandatory rotation. The model demonstrates conditions under which mandatory rotation could actually impair auditor independence, contrary to the popular view.

审计员任期和强制性审计员轮换的纪律作用

摘要：本文研究旨在解决国际上关于审计事务所是否应该强制轮换的争论。欧盟已经通过了强制性轮换制度，但美国尚未制定这些规则。该政策的支持者认为，长期审计师与客户的关系会导致审计师与客户建立过度的经济联系，这可能会削弱审计师的独立性。基于这一观点，本文构建了一个理论模型，比较了在有无强制轮换的制度下，审计师发布独立报告的动机。该模型展示了强制轮换实际上可能损害审计师独立性的条件，与流行观点相反。

亮点：（1）已有文献大多集中讨论审计任期和审计轮换对审计报告和审计质量的后果影响，而文章关注的是强制轮换法规的最根本目的——审计师的独立性，从轮换是否确实能够提高审计师的独立性来评价强制轮换的影响，对审计轮换制度的制定和实施有较大的意义；（2）不同于强制轮换审计师之后的效果，文章探究了轮换制度对审计师在最初选择客户的影响，因为强制轮换使得审计师为有问题的客户找寻下一任替代审计师的成本更低，因此在最初选择客户时不严格遵守独立性的成本相对更低，导致强制轮换可能会削弱审计师的独立性。

转自：会计学术联盟

文章来源于财会知微堂 ，作者吴晓纯

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